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ABSTRACT 
 
Orthodox and heterodox theories of financial crises are hereby compared from a theoretical 
viewpoint, with emphasis on their genesis. The former view (represented by the fourth-
generation models of Paul Krugman) reflects the neoclassical vision whereby turbulence is 
an exception; the latter insight (represented by the theories of Hyman P. Minsky) validates 
and extends John Maynard Keynes’s vision, since it is related to a modern financial world. 
The result of this theoretical exercise is that Minsky’s vision represents a superior 
explanation of financial crises and current events in financial systems because it considers 
the causes of financial crises as endogenous to the system. Crucial facts in relevant financial 
crises are mentioned in section 1, as an introduction; the orthodox models of financial crises 
are described in section 2; the heterodox models of financial crises are outlined in section 3; 
the main similarities and differences between orthodox and heterodox models of financial 
crises are identified in section 4; and conclusions based on the information provided by the 
previous section are outlined in section 5. References are listed at the end of the paper. 
 
Keywords: John Maynard Keynes; Hyman P. Minsky; Paul Krugman; Financial Crises; 
Financial Fragility; Asset Bubbles; Speculation 
 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern (bond market) financial crises started in Mexico in late 1994, followed by those in 
East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Argentina (2000), and Turkey (2001). Initially these were 
currency crises in which the pegged exchange rate regime had encouraged lending and the 
generation of asset bubbles, which then unearthed deeper asset market instability and was 
translated into reductions in investment and hence into problems in the real sector. The 
exchange rate was considered as the key financial asset (speculative vehicle), since it is the 
thermometer of emerging economies. 
Explanations of increasing content entered into the academic circles. The so called 
first-generation models (Krugman, 1979) and second-generation models (Obstfeld, 1994) of 
financial crisis were created to explain the causes, consequences, and remedies of this type 
of crisis.  
More specifically, first-generation models as described by Krugman (1979) explain 
crises as the product of budget deficits triggered by the movement in a fundamental 
macroeconomic variable. It is the need for seignorage to cover deficits which ensures a 
currency collapse generated (and aggravated) by a speculative attack on foreign reserves 
bringing on deflationary processes. One of the distribution channels is the balance of 
payments. 
Second-generation models (exemplified by Obstfeld 1994) explain crises as the result 
of a conflict between a fixed rate of exchange and the desire to conduct an expansionary 
monetary policy. An example of this kind of crisis is the turbulence suffered by the 
European Union in 1992, where finally strong economies benefitted (the United Kingdom), 
but relatively underdeveloped economies suffered (Spain or Italy).  
Nevertheless, some of these models were subsequently considered as ad-hoc 
explanations on previously known facts. Subsequent crises in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s (see Table 1) required a sounder explanation and hence new models of financial crises 
arose. In the crises in the late 1990s, the twin (and simultaneous) triggering factors were both 
exchange regimes and fragile banking systems. Underdeveloped economies suffered from 
either the “original sin” (arising from underdeveloped systems) or the impact of “moral 
hazard” (implicit rescue guarantees; Krugman 1999) on the exchange rate. 3 
In third-generation models (created by Kaminsky and Reinhart; 1996) it is argued 
that the core of the problem lies in the banking system. Moral hazard-driven lending 
provides a hidden subsidy to investment, which collapses when the government withdraws 
their implicit guarantees. At the end it is difficult to distinguish whether the exchange market 
or the banking system is the culprit of the crisis, but it is eventually translated into 
developments in the real sector. 
Fourth-generation models (described in Tornell 2004; Dornbusch 2001; especially in 
Krugman 1999, who asks for a more sophisticated third-generation model; and in Caballero 
2006) emphasize the roles of companies’ balance sheets and capital flows in economies 
which are affected by abrupt variations in the real exchange rate. Private debt plays a basic 
role in the aftermath of crises.  
Table 1 Financial Crises throughout the World (Currency Crises) 
Country/region  Year  ￿GDP (%), 
subsequent 
year 
Western Europe  1992/1993   
Mexico   1994  -6.2 
East Asia  1997  -7.5* 
Russia 1998   
Brazil 1999   
Turkey 2000   
Argentina 2001   
*In Indonesia 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The implication is that private debt has become central to the genesis and remedy of 
crises in these models, which also include public debt as the original cause of crises as it 
eventually affects private claims. The fourth-generation models, one of the subject matters of 
this paper are described in detail in the next section, especially those of Krugman 1999 and 
Caballero 2006.  
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2.  ORTHODOX MODELS OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
Emerging economies experienced swings during the mid-1990s (cf. Table 1). This is due to 
capital inflows that brought about constrained credit and hence a loss of control in financial 
domestic variables. In the beginning the study of crises was influenced by the know-how of 
advanced economies although crises occurred in the developing world.  
A further clarification was then needed. According to Calvo (2005), financial crisis 
theory concerning emerging markets progressed from focusing on such variables as fiscal 
deficits and real currency devaluation to stressing the function of financial assets flows as 
well as the role of credibility. On his part, Dornbusch (2001) expressed analogous concepts. 
Since the 1980s both globalization and concomitant, disordered increases in flows of 
capital led to high volatility in international financial markets. Some of these markets 
erupted into crises, in the form of runs on banks as well as attacks on currencies. More 
recently, these triggering effects have extended into the realms of real estate and gold, or any 
other sound financial instruments. 
In this type of view, the typical mobile (speculative vehicle) is capital inflows and 
outflows with risks and returns, and the symptom is bubbles. The creation—and use—of 
financial instruments must keep pace with economic growth, that is, expectations must be 
validated. If it is not the case, the result is macroeconomic distress and microeconomic 
effects (with their consequent aftermaths, policy implications, and remedies). Effects have 
included a significant increase in contagion and the collapse of both private banks and 
national institutions.  
Models should include causes, interrelations, and consequences in their explanation. 
In the case of dynamic models, triggering factors are also essential to comprehend the 
internal process involved. In orthodox models of financial crises the triggering factor is a 
financial asset that unearths the problems of the financial sector affecting the real sector and 
generating a crisis, through the impact of perceptions and the ensuing speculation. This state 
of affairs is eventually aggravated by pessimism and ineffective remedies.  
More recently, these models connect investment and debt since debt destroys the 
balance sheets of both real and financial firms (in both assets’ and liabilities’ main 
constituents), ultimately affecting output and confidence, thereby impacting certain 
industries and propitiating interest rates hikes. The triggering factor may be any financial 5 
asset and the behavior of assets holders, not only external debt (as in the 1982 crisis in 
Mexico) or the exchange rate (as in the 1994 crisis in Mexico). A highly relevant example of 
these models is now examined. 
 
The Neo-classical-Krugman Orthodox Model: The Fourth Generation Models of 
Financial (Currency) Crises 
This section synthesizes the argument exposed in Krugman 1999 which is also described in 
the Appendix. This type of model considers the role of money in a more in-depth (although 
partial and exogenous) manner. Investment is at the nucleus of this type of explanation as it 
is the engine of the system. According to Krugman 1999, neither first-generation nor second-
generation models make clear subsequent developments in terms of financial crises. As 
Krugman states: 
 In the major crisis countries of Asia, however, neither of these stories seems to have 
much relevance. By conventional fiscal measures the governments of the afflicted 
economies were in quite good shape at the beginning of 1997 (Krugman 1999, p.1). 
Clearly something else was at work; we badly need a “third-generation” crisis model 
(Krugman 1999, p.1). 
Most of the recent attempts to produce such a model have argued that the core of the 
problem lies in the banking system. McKinnon (1996) and others, myself included 
(Krugman 1998), have suggested that moral-hazard-driven lending could have 
provided a sort of hidden subsidy to investment, which collapsed when visible losses 
led governments to withdraw their implicit guarantees (Krugman 1999, p.1). 
Following Krugman 1999, a bank-centered explanation of crises was partially correct. Other 
forces were also at work—for example, financial distress at the international level. Other 
major effects and triggering factors, respectively, are companies’ balance sheets in response 
to reductions in investment and capital flows affecting both expectations and real exchange 
rates. This is related to policy implications and remedies of crises. 
Krugman’s model aims to clarify the role of balance sheet problems in restricting 
productive investment and the impact of the exchange rate on those balance sheets. Then he 
shows how these developments generate a vicious circle that can cause an economy to go 
through a financial crisis. Then he analyzes the IMF strategy of mitigating currency 6 
depreciation in order to protect against this balance-sheet effect, and shows how this remedy 
may simply engender an alternative kind of vicious circle.  
Krugman states that the worsening of balance sheets played a significant role in the 
crisis. In addition, recovery seems to be difficult because of the weakened financial situation 
of firms, whose capital has in many crises been wiped out by the combination of declining 
demand, high interest rates, and a depreciated currency. These balance sheet problems bring 
about the problem of nonperforming banking loans, rather than being a banking problem. 
In order to reverse the worsening of its current account, the country must undertake a 
large depreciation, which deteriorates the liabilities of local firms. Hence the exchange rate 
crisis has a sustained impact on the economy. The point is that the economy has to repair the 
balance sheets. Banks do not necessarily play an essential role. Banks experience balance 
sheet effects but respond restraining credit and hence investment. 
 
Krugman’s Model 
The production function is assumed Cobb-Douglas: 
yt  = Kt
αLt
1-α             ( 1 )  
Entrepreneurs undertake domestic investment (creating capital and increasing yt). Thus 
investment plays a decisive function. 
By assumption a share µ of both consumption and investment spending corresponds 
to imports, whereas 1-µ corresponds to domestic goods. The rest of the world is assumed to 
be larger than the local economy, and to spend a negligible fraction of its income on 
domestic goods. If the foreign elasticity of substitution is also 1, the value of local exports in 
terms of foreign goods is fixed at X. Therefore the value of domestic goods is pX, where p is 
the real exchange rate. 
If the share of domestic income accrued to workers spending is 1-α, then: 
y = (1-µ)I + (1-µ)C + pX = (1-µ)I + (1-α)(1-µ)y + pX       (2) 
If I and C are, respectively, investment and consumption of domestic goods, the real 
exchange rate is as follows. Equilibrium in the market for domestic goods requires that: 
pt  = yt[1-(1-α)(1-µ)] - (1-µ)It/   X            ( 3 )  7 
This implies that: 
 It ≤ (1+λ)Wt              ( 4 )  
This is a binding constraint. The higher is investment in the local economy, the lower is its 
real exchange rate. Investment is the basic variable as in Keynes’s analysis and may be 
constrained by entrepreneurs’ wealth. What happens is that under diminished expectations, 
lenders may restrain leverage, which means that entrepreneurs can only borrow at most λ 
times their initial wealth. 
By assumption, the existence of the constraint implies that p
-μ may be taken as a 
constant. This means that entrepreneurs may not borrow up to the upper limit, that is, beyond 
the point at which the real yield on local investment equals that on foreign investment. For 
comprehending this point, it is necessary to compare the foreign real interest rate, r*, with 
the return obtained by converting foreign goods into domestic. This requires transforming 
the next-period return back into:  
1 + rt = Gk(It-1 p
-µ,   L )              ( 5 )  
Nevertheless, a unit of foreign goods can be converted into pt units of domestic goods this 
period and the return can be converted into 1/pt+1 units in the next period. Therefore, the 
statement that the return on domestic investment must be at least as large as that on foreign 
bonds is expressed as: 
(1 + rt)(pt/pt+1) ≥ 1 + r*           (6) 
Moreover, as: 
It  ≥ 0               (7) 
According to the circumstances, (4), (6), or (7) may be the constraint. What is entrepreneurs’ 
wealth? Entrepreneurs own all domestic capital, but they may also own other foreign claims 
and/or have debts to foreigners. By assumption some claims are denominated in terms of the 
domestic good, but others are denominated in terms of the foreign good. If capital lasts only 
one period, the value of local capital equals the income accruing to capital within the current 
period.  
If D and F are the net debts of domestic entrepreneurs indexed to domestic and foreign 
goods respectively, this will be domestic currency and foreign currency debt respectively, 8 
although they are actually denominated in goods. In this case the current wealth of 
entrepreneurs is: 
Wt = αy   -   D   -   p F              ( 8 )  
This equation can be used to inspect how a financial crisis can occur in an open economy. 
 
The Transfer Problem and Financial Crisis 
The wealth of each entrepreneur depends on the level of his (her) borrowing in the whole 
economy, because the volume of capital inflows affects both the terms of trade and the 
valuation of foreign currency-denominated debt. Therefore a decline in capital inflows can 
adversely impact the local balance sheets, reducing entrepreneurs’ borrowing.  
Credit supply may depend on lenders’ expectations about the value of the borrower’s 
collateral. But because some debt is foreign-denominated, this value depends on the real 
exchange rate and hence on the actual level of borrowing taking place. This process seems to 
tend to a neo-classical-type of equilibrium related to a set of self-confirming guesses. 
If, ceteris paribus, wealth depends on p and it is clear from (3) that I determines p. If 
If is the “financeable” level of investment, that is, the level of investment that would occur if 
the leverage constraint (4) were binding, entrepreneurs’ borrowing depends on their wealth, 
then: 
dW/dI = (1-µ)F/X                 (9) 
dIf/dI = (1+μ)(1-µ)F/X          (10) 
If dIf/dI > 1 there can be multiple equilibria. The possibility exists that a loss of lender 
confidence will be validated by a financial crash. More specifically, if local-currency debt is 
high, entrepreneurs may be unable to borrow even with a favorable exchange rate, and 
depression may arise. 
At high levels of I
e ,(4) is irrelevant. Instead, investment is determined by the rate-of-
return constraint (6). Conversely, at low levels of expected I firms are bankrupt. The 
constraint (7) is too strong for them. 
At the intermediate level I is constrained by financing. The intermediate equilibrium 
is unstable under any expectation formation. There are two other possible outcomes. The 
first one is a high-level outcome H in which investment may be taken up to the point where 9 
the local foreign rate of returns equals the foreign rate of return. There may also be a low-
level result I in which lenders do not believe that local entrepreneurs may have any 
guarantee. In this case their failure to provide funds is the consequence of a depreciated 
currency implying that entrepreneurs are bankrupt. 
For example, in the 1997 financial crisis (cf. Table 1) there was a collapse from H to 
L, which did not mean that the previous investments were weak, but only that there was 
financial fragility because of high debt. In this model, the factors that make financial 
collapse possible are low marginal propensity to import and large foreign-currency debt 
relative to exports but especially high leverage. 
These factors make the circle—from investment to real exchange rate to balance 
sheets to investment—more influential. The message is that high leverage matters. Only 
after 1990 (globalization), emerging economies began extensive foreign-denominated 
borrowing and crises ensued. Foreign borrowing placed them at risk of financial collapse. 
 
The Dilemma of Stabilization 
Former models of currency crisis are silent about the problems posed by foreign-currency 
debt, but this is the major consequence of financial crises. And the risks of that debt were 
why the prescription for defending currencies was interest rates hikes in order to both halting 
capital outflows and attracting capital inflows. The upshot was to hold the real exchange rate 
p constant even when the willingness of foreign lenders to finance investment was reduced. 
As something else must have been given, the common assumption is that economic activity 
declines. 
If that is the case and if p is held constant, y will be determined by a kind of 
Keynesian-Kahnian multiplier process. If (2) is rearranged: 
y = pX + (1-µ)I/1 - (1-α) ( 1 - µ )          ( 1 1 )  
But a share α of output goes to profits, thus a reduction in investment will diminish 
entrepreneurs' wealth: 
dW/dI = α(1-µ)/1 - (1-α) ( 1 - µ )            ( 1 2 )  
The feedback from actual to financeable investment is: 
dIf/dI = (1+α)α(1-µ)/1 - (1-α) ( 1 - µ )          ( 1 3 )  10 
According to Krugman 1999, stabilizing the currency closes one channel for potential 
financial collapse. Nevertheless, it opens another. If leverage is high, the economy may 
stabilize its real exchange rate only at the price of a self-reinforcing decline in economic 
activity (cf. Appendix). This is why only emerging economies suffer from crises as they 
possess weak balance sheets (the “original sin”). 
In terms of causes, something external, according to Krugman (1999), provoked the 
crisis. Thus, whereas Krugman acknowledges the roles of both investment and debt during 
the unfolding of the crisis, his model is silent about the internal nature of the crisis, except 
that it started in the real sector (in terms of entrepreneurial wealth).  
Thus, these models pay no attention to the fact that productive investment (and the 
twin processes of assets allocation and financial investment) is endogenously determined in 
the financial sector. This is a key message of Keynes with respect to the performance of 
modern economies. 
 
Policy Implications of Krugman’s and Similar Models 
Only emerging economies are prone to financial and entrepreneurial vulnerability through 
balance sheet problems. As triggering factors are external and then crises take the form of 
isolated episodes, policy implications are the use of prophylactic (nonessential, ex post) 
measures such as interest rate hikes, capital controls, ex post regulation, and the provision of 
emergency credit lines.  
Nevertheless, orthodox models are silent about deep (and preventive) financial 
structural reforms, except by the construction of a new financial architecture (Frankel 2003), 
bank restructuring, risk management, and bank capitalization (Basel III 2011), treating these 
measures however as if causes of crises would refer to exogenous (exceptional) factors, even 
taking these remedies as if the problem is miscalculations in risk management. 
In other orthodox models (cf. Tornell, Westermann, and Martínez 2004), the 
causality and its corresponding policy implications are very similar. For them since the 
1980s a process of liberalization, especially in financial systems, was initiated and 
accelerated throughout the world. This has been a long-term process that has brought about 
reforms enhancing growth and has made stronger economies, especially in the emerging 
world. Once again crises are isolated (corrective) episodes, or the price to be paid for 
liberalizations.  11 
Since crises are not inherent to capitalist economies, they do not impede long-term 
growth. The corresponding policy implication is that more liberalization (and hence less 
regulation) is required with industrial misallocations (at both the domestic and the 
international levels) being the price to be paid. This is a kind of Darwinian argument 
whereby many enterprises or industries fail during the process.  
 
Similar Orthodox Explanations of Financial Crises: Shortage of Assets 
Economies are vulnerable due to either moral hazard or the “original sin.” The former refers 
to abuse in private and public debt before a lender of last resort, whereas the latter states that 
underdeveloped economies are highly prone to experience crises due to weak industrial and 
financial structures and that the remedy is growth and privatizations, that is, more market 
orientation is needed in underdeveloped economies. Other orthodox insights are related to 
mismatches between short-term debt and long-term debt. 
From a more holistic perspective, Caballero (2006) talks about the macroeconomics 
of assets shortages. The shortage of financial assets throughout the world is at the core of his 
explanation. He treats this issue as the cause, instead of the symptom, of problems in 
unstable economies. 
For Caballero (2006) there are many assets demanders and few assets producers. As 
assets production requires financial restructuring, financial innovation, and growth, the 
critical point is the response of assets prices and valuations to shortages. Scarcity generates 
global imbalances and speculative bubbles—for example, those in emerging economies. 
Shortages are seen as temporary insufficiency in international liquidity due to low interest 
rates, low inflations, and deflation episodes. 
In this view emerging markets have contributed to the current worldwide shortage of 
assets. Firms and individuals borrow for catching up and for smoothing inter-temporary 
consumption (a neo-classical insight). In general terms assets shortages are due to three 
types of deficiencies: micro, macro, and political. In synthesis, local assets have low value 
and safety and agents search for international assets. 
Speculative bubbles are based on the short-term returns of assets (capital gains) 
rather than on dividends which entails dynamic inefficiency, but at the end equilibrium is 
achieved. Speculative booms do not imply fragility. In recent times both real state and 12 
corporate assets are the focus of attention, but at the beginning appreciation fueled 
appreciations. 
Investors’ moods cause an implosion in local asset values as they bring about scarcity 
in international liquidity. If yields increase, the value of the collateral also rises. This implies 
that risks increase, which requires ex post intervention in isolated episodes.  This is due to 
shocks being accidents and money or financial assets do not play the main role in the story. 
An implication is that developed economies differ from emerging economies as the 
former are assets producers. In the event of a crash, developed economies are more resilient 
since they are able to absorb imbalances on the availability of assets. The corollary is that 
only excessive risk-taking and shortages of good assets require intervention on the part of 
central banks. State-of-the art regulation is able to contain shocks. 
On the other hand, the conduction of monetary policy (by modifying inflation targets 
by means of rules) improves risk management processes. This line of thought does not 
address the problem of deprivation of credit; the long-term solution of crises is financial 
development, as sound assets crowd out bubbles (cf. Caballero 2006). 
Nevertheless, globalization spreads assets shortages into the world at large. Hence, 
the crises are not exclusive of emerging economies. Global imbalances exist neglecting the 
fact that the anglo-saxons supply assets. This only means that assets flows are uneven. The 
relevant point is that assets shortages are due to interest rate decreases, which explains why 
speculative episodes are occasional. 
In this type of explanation, speculative bubbles are, along with inflation reductions, 
just market mechanisms for bridging gaps in assets. Bubbles must exist: If yields are 
diminished then bubbles arise (cf. Caballero 2006) and spread across the whole economy. 
Are there escape valves in the economy? The cost is a deflation with a Phillips 
Curve, and the economy waits for the Pigou Mechanism to restore lost assets, although the 
Pigou Effect only operates under certain conditions according to Minsky. 
This orthodox model, however, recognizes that crashes are more abrupt than booms, 
but not that booms generate busts. Once again, crashes are due to strange shocks and 
misguided policies. Whereas low interest rates have caused the problem, this is considered as 
an exogenous development. Somehow interest rates are low at a certain moment so that 
forces are external to the model. 13 
Agents face Knightian uncertainty, in the sense that they can manage risks within 
certain boundaries. Unlike in Monetarism, no mechanic rules must exist. All intermediaries 
maximize values and free collaterals and atomism (the Village-Fair Paradigm) is implicitly 
assumed. Yet financial intermediaries understand their risks but are uncertain about others. 
In synthesis, assets shortages are the source of instability (rather than either 
uncertainty or investment in the sense of Keynes). These types of shortages produce global 
imbalances, deflations (not debt deflations), recurrent bubbles, and financial panic. Bubbles 
and their remedies are explained in the model of Caballero (2006) by means of a mathematic 
model with equilibrium at its center.  
Assets shortages are by the way the source of recent macroeconomic developments 
since the 1990s. As causes of financial crashes are not deep or systematic in these models, 
the prescription is that financial systems must grow in qualitative terms throughout the 
world. Nevertheless, this explanation neglects that many historians of economic thought, as 
well as many economists, had advanced explanations of financial crises since the 1950s. 
If bubbles are a necessary condition for attaining equilibrium however, this is a 
similar argument to that expressed by Friedman in the sense that speculation is stabilizing 
(Friedman 1966). This is not surprising, as the hard core of Monetarists is the same as that of 
the neo-classical economists, both neglecting Keynes’s message about uncertainty and the 
nonexistence of a self-regulatory mechanism on the part of the system. 
 
Policy Implications in the Event of Assets Shortages 
Assets shortages imply optimal policy responses whereby risk management is necessary as a 
remedy rather than prevention as appropriate risk management implies high-valuation 
equilibria. Orthodox economists, at least in the models described above, believe in 
equilibrium, rationality, and the nonexistence of structural weaknesses in the system. These 
weaknesses are normally corrected by means of market measures. 
Equilibrium will eventually be reached as bubbles only exist in a high-valuations 
environment. The point is that returns and hence assets valuations must not exceed economic 
growth. That is, crises are exogenous. 
Financial development must increase assets supply and reduce the demand for assets. 
If speculative valuations are part of equilibria the implication is to minimize resource 
misallocations.  14 
Policy makers must strengthen both collateral positions and risk management shifting 
and reduce the conditions for the arising of “moral hazard” (actually a Krugman’s intuition). 
Since the use of collaterals increases the efficiency of the financial system, the role of the 
lender of last resort must be at best corrective in certain instances. This leaves them 
wondering why macroeconomists are needed.  
The classical orthodox solution is to reduce interest rates to increase economic 
activity and to avoid speculation in the relevant asset. However, these variables represent the 
symptoms (or the effects) of crises. They are not the cause. The actual remedy should be 
preventive banking with an eye on uncertainty and potential entrepreneurial problems. This 
is the main message of the model outlined in the next section. 
 
3.  HETERODOX MODELS OF FINANCIAL CRISES: THE MINSKY MODEL 
 
Orthodox models were constructed for explaining the financial crises in the 1990s. The crisis 
of Mexico in 1994 was produced by a combination of over-lending (which was accelerated 
since 1992) with an exchange-rate peg (which started in 1987). Nevertheless, in terms of the 
genesis of the crisis, Mexico certainly suffered from financial fragility (in terms of debt). 
The next task is, thus, resorting to the message of Minsky in the explanation of the unfolding 
of financial crises. The outline of Minsky’s theory follows the expositions of some post-
Keynesians mentioned in the references. 
 
Keynes's Influence on the Minskyan Model 
Keynes demonstrated that money is not a veil in terms of the impact of its variations on the 
real sector, specifically through investment. He was also interested in the theory of liquidity 
preference (linked indirectly to investment). Hence, he developed a superior conception of 
the financial sector.  
Minsky followed the message of Keynes to the extreme of considering that the 
financial sector, both in terms of assets and liabilities, was at the heart of the unfolding of 
crises in terms of causes, motives, interrelations, and consequences, wherein booms generate 
busts. This consideration made his model endogenous. Given that money is the main 
component of the system, it has an impact on the real sector and ignites financial crises. 
The core of Minsky’s model is the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) with both 
investment and debt at its center. Minsky sees a modern financial system, which has 15 
feedback with the real sector. But this relationship between the financial and the real sectors 
can be adverse due to the possibility of the existence of instability. FIH can be de described 
as follows. 
 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis  
Minsky advanced theories for explaining financial market fragility and its consequences 
since the 1970s (Minsky 1974, 1982a, 1986, 1993). Bubbles endogenously arise from 
developments in financial markets. In booms corporate cash flows rise beyond debt. 
However, immediately after, debts exceed borrowers’ payments. At the same time agents 
feeling free of commitments develop speculation, lenders tighten credit, and investment and 
production contract. This is known as the "Minsky moment". Booms generate busts amid 
asset bubbles.  
Minsky had experience as a practitioner and also had a historical (rather than a 
logical
2) view. Furthermore, he also considered the deregulation processes of the 1980s as 
primary causes of crises. In his view financial innovation and diversification (along with 
fraud and “cooperation” between private and public sectors) all paved the way for the crises 
in the 1990s. This is also outlined in recent post-Minskyan heterodox views of financial 
crises (cf. Wray 2009).  
Following Keynes, Minsky’s theories emphasize the macroeconomic dangers of 
speculative bubbles in asset prices (for instance, in an exchange rate) as well as the notion of 
uncertainty. This is at odds with the mainstream view, which considers speculation as self-
stabilizing with only microeconomic (and short-term) effects. In addition, money plays a 
minor role on the functioning of economies in the neo-classical view, where both certainty 
and perfect information play a pivotal role.  
In Minsky's view, the internal mechanism pushing an economy toward a crisis is the 
accumulation of private debt. This is related to both assets allocation and investment and to 
cash flows. In his well-known taxonomy, Minsky distinguishes three types of borrowers, 
which contribute to the accumulation of—eventually—insolvent debt. They are hedge, 
speculative, and Ponzi. 
If the use of Ponzi finance (which is either unwise in terms of timing or fraudulent 
perhaps based on inside information) reaches a critical mass, then domino falls of Ponzi 
                                                            
2 In the sense that he does not consider that the system must necessarily tend to equilibrium. 16 
borrowers can cause the system to implode when the bubble pops—for example, when asset 
prices stop increasing due to news or supply shocks. As a consequence, the speculative 
borrower and even hedge borrowers can no longer refinance the principal. In both cases the 
decomposition process is accelerated by—non-borrower—speculators.  
Many elements of Minsky’s analysis are present in the list of orthodox models: News 
(Dornbusch 1980; Frenkel 1982), the Peso Problem (Rietz 1988), or Bubbles (Blanchard 
1979). These are actually models of exchange rate determination, but they are the prototype-
models of financial crises. News refers to the impact on the exchange rate of the arrival of 
new information. The Peso Problem is an explanation of hihg-risk premia when events 
which were considered ex ante do not materialize in the future. It assumes rationality. 
Bubbles refer to the impact of overvaluation on the economy. However, these elements are 
analyzed in isolation, and shocks in these explanations are always abnormal.  
Moreover, investors are heterogeneous. They are also at different stages and they 
take into account developments in the international financial sector. For these considerations, 
Minsky’s model is very rich in terms of the genesis, with details in terms of interrelations 
and its emphasis on the role of financial systems in the unfolding of crises. 
Minsky also furthered Keynes’s notions about the interrelations between the real and 
financial sectors and the fact that financial markets can observe excessive movements as a 
norm. But Minsky gave real expression to Keynes's concept of uncertainty. 
Minsky's theories about debt accumulation explain the subprime mortgage crisis of 
the late 2000s, whereby the initial assets targeted by speculators were housing prices. In 
2007, lenders funded Ponzi borrowers. Both of them assumed that housing prices would 
continue to increase forever. As lenders had inside information or market power, they made 
abnormal gains.  
The progression through Minsky's three borrowing stages simply reflected the credit 
and housing bubbles built throughout the crisis. Thus, the causes of the problem were 
endogenous. Demand for housing was both a cause and a consequence of expanding shadow 
banking systems, which encouraged even riskier mortgage loans. When the bubble burst the 
opposite progression ignited a world financial crisis due to contagion, which was fueled by 
perceptions. 17 
The economy is highly volatile because expectations are highly volatile as well. 
Speculation fueled by debt is based on the valuation of financial instruments. It is based on 
unpredictable, but objective factors. Moreover, speculation disturbs the efficiency and 
stability of the system, being an emerging property of the complex system. Money is the 
relevant variable of instability in the system through its effects on debt and investment and, 
thus, FIH contradicts the analysis of the neo-classical synthesis whereby the role of money is 
neglected.  
Clearly macroeconomics exists since instability has to be addressed. For Minsky debt 
leads and investment responds. Investment is constrained by firms’ finance rather than by 
moods or animal spirits. Hence, Minsky objectively identifies the source of uncertainty, a 
core concept of Keynes. Minsky’s theories have not been incorporated into mainstream 
economics. Furthermore, the orthodox view precludes private debt as a cause. 
 
More Details on the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) 
The idea is that stability is destabilizing in a capitalist system since processes are driven by 
internal financial developments. FIH is both an investment theory of the business cycle (like 
in Keynes) and a financial theory of investment. In that way Minsky extends Keynes’s 
message.  
Profits are the key variable for both debt validation and the valuation of capital 
assets. This is the theoretical reconstruction of an economy with a sophisticated financial 
system and with endogenous money. The analysis departs from dynamic cash flows (both 
income and revenues) and the interdependence among balance sheets (assets of some units 
and liabilities of others). Balance sheets are affected by expectations. Finance (and 
especially external finance) is raised on the expectation of uncertain cash flows. 
Uncertainty not only affects production but also financial commitments and hence 
liability structures. Investment may be financed through portfolio allocations and debt, and 
this constrains liquidity affecting balance sheets.  
All this accounts for the importance of the two-price model whereby products have a 
price level whereas assets have another price level, the latter being based on expectations. 
Leverage and debt services are not sustainable if profit levels become unacceptable. This 
rules out the idea of perfect competition prevailing in orthodoxy where profits tend to zero.  18 
Thus, fragility is not the result of an underdeveloped financial system but the normal 
result in capitalism. The implication is that an external shock may detonate but not cause a 
financial crisis. For instance, interest rate fluctuations produce instability, thereby generating 
financial collapses, impeding economic growth, and bringing about unemployment (which is 
hence not due to insufficiencies in effective demand). 
The interaction between assets, investment, and production determines the 
endogenous and cyclical system dynamics. Endogenously refers to the fact that structures 
evolve from robust to fragile. Keynes’s notion of liquidity preference is extended by Minsky 
to all financial assets and investment refers to both physical and capital assets. 
Minsky’s theoretical targets are the ceilings and floors that must be set by authorities. 
His method is the use of a piece-linear model with a historical focus. The implication is that 
microeconomics possesses macroeconomic foundations and uncertainty gives the analysis a 
dynamic character. 
Minsky pays attention to the monetary circuit (M-C-M’), where M = money and C = 
commodities. In this view profits agents are profit-maximizers. The financial system is 
comprised by institutions, markets, instruments, and practices. 
The core of Minsky’s model is money matters, markets work out of equilibrium, and 
both governments and central banks play a crucial funtion. For Keynes, changes in 
expectations (via its effect on productive investment) detonate crises, but Minsky 
incorporates the analysis of debt and therefore the role of both banks and companies. 
Whereas Keynes is focused on cash flows, Minsky concentrated on both cash flows and 
debt.  
If financial deregulation and innovation impinge on the endogenous development of 
the system, these aspects are not analyzed by those of the orthodoxy who think that crises are 
provoked by exogenous factors. In terms of both vision and method, organicism is a key 
concept in Minsky. Organicism is defined as a system in which the sum of their constituents 
is more than the number of those constituents, and its interrelations are neither simple nor 
unidirectional. This due to Minsky proposes a philosophy of endogenous change (cf. Keen 
2001). 
Finally, financial vulnerability is difficult to measure since mathematical modeling 
and nonstationary processes clash with a sequential and a historical method of analysis. In 19 
the latter type of analysis, the future is not a continuation of the past. Moreover, phenomena 
are casuistic and noneternal.  
The focus must also be on the financing of investment (and of positions). For 
Minsky, capitalism is a complex system in the sense that it is comprised by interrelated 
balance sheets. Risk cannot be eliminated as it is always present. If portfolio compositions 
reflect uncertainty, instability comes from the assets side too.  
Minsky is hence against IS-LM (Investment Saving/Liquidity preference Money 
supply) or Monetarist models that leave aside the concept of uncertainty and where money is 
neutral. Furthermore, these models are static and atomistic (in the sense that interrelations do 
not play a pivotal role in the evolution processes). Financial relations are highly 
sophisticated since an expectational term always operates in them. Minsky thus rejects the 
laissez faire–market efficiency-rationality paradigm with its idolatry for equilibrium. No 
room exists in his analysis for the Modigliani-Miller theorem. 
Capitalism is not able to advance in a straight line but in waves of panics and 
euphoria. For Minsky, finance is the source of instability. However, Keynes set the right 
direction by initiating the paradigm of money relevance, uncertainty, and asset allocation in 
economics. He also blurred the distinction between the real and the financial sectors. 
Whereas exogenous factors impact the system at the beginning, sequential 
endogenous factors affect the system at the end. This is related to the transit from stability to 
instability. Any economy with increasing private debt is highly exposed to investment 
fluctuations and therefore to endogenous disruptions in growth. Policies to balance cash 
flows are required for restoring equilibrium as can be seen in the next subsection.  
 
Policy Implications 
For Minsky, solutions are not permanent or valid in every case when addressing the 
problems of instability and unfairness of market economies. The main idea is that instability 
exists and there must be policy reactions (financial reforms) to it. The financial system 
requires policy intervention since its vehicle is finance.  
There has been increased interest in the policy implications of Minsky’s theories 
since the financial crisis of 2007, considering that prevention is very relevant. According to 
Minsky, at the end swings can be mitigated, anticipated, or controlled. The implication is the 20 
implementation of counter-cyclical policies. A suggestion for regulators is the need for 
mandatory contingent requirements of capital.  
Measures must be ex ante as evolution is a dialectical process. Policies must differ 
from those of the orthodoxy as there is an interplay between endogenous forces and 
institutions as the system evolves (in terms of both financial assets and investment).  
The money manager is the key figure. Profits arise from a scarcity of financing for 
capital goods and this has to be addressed as the valuation of capital goods and instruments 
affects investment.  
According to Minsky, discretionary intervention from both the government (budget 
deficits) and the central bank (lender of last resort) mitigates instability by creating upper 
and lower limits for constraining the dynamics of the system. Policy targets in institutions 
are of the socialization of investment and restructuring of government activities. 
Government must undertake deficits in order to support profit levels, generate automatic 
stabilizers, and conduct discretionary policies, providing a continuous set of remedies rather 
than palliatives. 
Central bank intervention refers to the stabilization of interest rates and assets prices, 
since budget deficits bring about higher profits which strengthen balance sheets and assets 
prices. Nevertheless, the central bank can only detain and counteract damages in the system. 
In addition, financial structures must be simplified. Finally, central banks must do monetary 
policy and regulate and reform the financial system (paying attention to expansion, 
innovation, and practices in the management of financial instruments).  
In this sense, the suggestion is to move away from debt to equity financing as a 
permanent remedy for reducing risks arising from interest rate hikes (cf. Muñoz and 
Snowden 2006). But this is both an institutional problem and a problem of 
underdevelopment in the financial system.  
The targets of speculation must be addressed as most behaviors are speculative. The 
problem is that the monetary transmission mechanism operates through the balance-sheet 
channel, especially when financial activities are not controlled and hence it affects credit. 
Finally, the management of the money supply affects firms’ conditions given that increases 
in interest rates fuel debts and reduce the price of assets as well as bank lending. 21 
If there are swings of optimism and pessimism which pose a macroeconomic 
problem, the difficulty can only be attacked by implementing preventive measures with 
respect to the links between investment and debt. The next section outlines the differences 
between the orthodox and the heterodox views on financial crises. 
 
4.  SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ORTHODOX AND 
HETERODOX MODELS OF FINANCIAL CRISES: IMPLOSION VERSUS 
EXPLOSION  
 
Similarities between orthodox and heterodox models are simple. In both cases crises start 
with a large and sudden decline in the price of a main financial asset, the size and fastness of 
this reduction reflecting the extent and severity of the crisis and the loss of credibility as well 
as the reach of contagion. Contagion is automatic once expectations are negative. 
In both types of models, investment is the engine of both the system and business 
cycles, and hence emphasis must be placed on the financing of investment, debt, and balance 
sheets. The crises ultimately affect output and employment everywhere as well as income 
distribution and inflation in emerging economies (see Baldacci et al. 2002). This explanation 
is also about the effects of crises on ex post fiscal retrenchment.  
Therefore, domestic vulnerability is relevant in both the industrial and the financial 
sectors. The implication is that crises require reforms in financial sectors. However, these are 
the only commonalities between the two sets of models, which are superficial. The orthodox 
models talk about domestic vulnerability, but this is external. This brings us to differences. 
 
Differences between Orthodox and Heterodox Models of Financial Crises 
Neo-classical-type models talk about what must be rather than what is, unlike heterodox 
models. A consequence is that differences are deeper and more interesting than 
commonalities. In orthodox explanations of financial crises, the system tends to equilibrium 
like in the neo-classical world. Moreover, in orthodox models atomism and the passivity of 
money are the implicit assumptions. In contrast, endogeneity and organicism (as opposed to 
atomism) are two characteristics of a complex system as that described in Minsky regarding 
Wall Street economies.  22 
Atomism as advocated by village-fair economies, like in the neo-classical world, is 
translated into the following respects: 
-  Economic agents are homogeneous (the so-called homus economicus). 
-  Financial and industrial sectors are not linked. 
-  Such external factors as industrial problems, trade deficits, contagion, and supply 
shocks propitiate crises. 
-  Neither money nor uncertainty plays a decisive role in economic events. 
The consequence is that orthodox explanations rely on exogenous triggering factors, just as 
supply shocks were introduced as an explanation of disturbances by neo-classical 
macroeconomists during the 1980s.  
The story is different for heterodox economists. To begin with, for Keynes there 
exists underemployment equilibrium, animal spirits, uncertainty, and the economy functions 
as a unity (organicism). As a consequence of this, the heterodox view of financial crises 
relies on endogenous factors in the unfolding of crises. In particular, Minsky makes 
uncertainty operational, wherein booms generate busts through his typology of debt. The 
ultimate outcome is that investment decreases and propitiates crises. This is the endogenous 
explanation of financial crises, which can be internally cured.  
For these reasons Minsky’s model is a more complete explanation of how the 
economy actually works rather than how it must work provided that markets operate in an 
efficient manner. Minsky links investment with debt (cash flows and profits with 
commitments) within a historical framework. Financial innovation and financial regulation 
not only exacerbate but cause debt problems in a system that is in permanent evolution. 
The orthodox explanation is insufficient because it ignores the pivotal role of money 
in the unfolding of crises. Moreover, for heterodox explanations of financial crises: 
-  Financial institutions are the essential part of the system.  
-  The profit motive (and destabilizing speculation) must be considered as part of the 
explanation of instability. In contrast, abnormal profits do not exist in a perfectly 
competitive system which automatically tends to equilibrium in the neo-classical 
view. 23 
-  Destabilizing speculation is a triggering factor in heterodox explanations. However, 
orthodox economists believe in rationality and equilibrium and hence in stabilizing 
speculation (cf. Friedman 1966). 
-  The evolution of money supply is irrelevant (or insufficient) for explaining the 
problem of financial crises for heterodoxy. 
-  Abnormal information, price rigidities, occasional deficiencies or co-ordination 
failures are not the cause of the problem in a complex system. 
-  Mismatches in assets compositions are the rule rather than the exception, although 
Keynes talks about a price (rate) that equilibrates the market of all assets. 
-  The existence of efficiency in the banking sector with only occasional deviations 
from rationality is a myth. 
-  The role of government is preventive in Minsky’s model, but palliative in the 
orthodox models. 
Some orthodox models discuss the implications of short-term profits in banks’ 
behavior and global schemes of risk but not in terms of uncertainty. For Minsky, profits 
along with debts (a topic not analyzed by Keynes) lie at the core of the development of 
crises. The corollary is that the structure of financial agencies must be inherently reformed. 
The orthodox analysis separates investment from leverage decisions. In FIH the 
interaction of investment and debt levels is what ultimately triggers a crisis. Whereas both 
Keynes and Minsky are focused on behavioral finance, orthodox models rely on equilibrium 
and rationality, efficient markets, and perfect information and complete knowledge 
following the neo-classical direction. Some versions of the orthodox models seem to be 
based on a book of Corporate Finance (cf. Caballero 2006). 
In the study of financial crises, investment is the engine of the system and money its 
main emerging property. However, in the orthodox models causes are not deep and 
interrelations are simple as well as exogenous, atomistic, direct, and linear, precluding them 
from explaining the problem. The implication is that the main message of the heterodox 
view on financial crises is that crises retard growth. In contrast, orthodox economists 
consider crises as necessary in the process of liberalization. In terms of policy implications, 24 
any model addressing internal causes will be more successful. If prevision is undertaken, 
cycles will be smoother.  
Finally, in terms of method Minsky’s model follows a sequence of explanations in an 
increasing order in terms of complexity in interrelations with a historical focus, whereas for 
orthodox economists explanations are positive (only addressing facts) and given in 
mathematical terms.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Conclusions are implicit in the analysis undertaken in the former section, but they are 
extended now. There is a link between Krugman’s crises models and Minsky's hedge, debt 
analysis. This being now acknowledged brings about a further upsurge in the literature of 
asymmetry and coordination failures. Nevertheless, Minsky disliked asymmetry and 
coordination failures, as his vision biased incentives to intermediate capital flows that are the 
normal condition of capitalist economies.  
In the global financial crisis of 2007 with private debt and government budget 
deficits, monetary policy and “money manager capitalism” in the financial markets all 
contributed to the crisis, but the conventional wisdom is that the triggering factor was 
mortgages.  What is the best explanation, orthodox or heterodox? 
According to the former sections of this investigation, there are differences between 
these sets of models in terms of essence, content, reach and limitations, equilibrium, time, 
concept of man, and dichotomy of markets and agents. Organicism, expectations, the 
consideration of cash flows and debt, and the role of money are the main contributions of 
heterodox economists to the explanation of crises. All of these elements may be referred to 
as differences between Keynes and the neo-classical economists. 
Based on these insights, it is hereby argued that a heterodox (deeper) analysis along 
Minskyan lines produces a more coherent theoretical and policy analysis of the newer and 
more complex financial crises. The principal difference between orthodoxy and heterodoxy 
(as represented by Minsky) is that fourth-generation models consider that shocks producing 
instability are exogenous to the system and therefore random. Moreover, orthodox models 
are unable to predict crises as they confuse symptoms with causes. This is a methodological 
weakness. 25 
In Minsky’s FIH shocks arise from uncertainty. In this explanation taking account of 
timing is essential for preventing crises and this timing can be anticipated by resorting to 
Minsky three stages in the unfolding of debt as an actual early warning system. 
On the other hand, policy prescriptions in Minsky (FIH) address structural problems 
in the financial sector that can be fixed by means of reforms and the provision of liquidity 
and solvency, considering the role of big government. In the orthodox view, the role of 
government is limited to solve crises. 
Orthodox theories are a repetition of neo-classical theories, where disequilibrium is 
an anomaly and money is a veil. They have nothing relevant to say about financial crises in 
the sense that they derive their views on the alienation and exogeneity of money from both 
the Classical and the Walrasian views as well as their ignorance about historical time.  
All of this arises from Keynes’s concept of an inherently unstable financial system 
and especially from his vision on simultaneous asset equilibrium. This is in turn partially 
originated from Marx’s vision, specifically from the identity defining the functioning of the 
system: M-C-M’ (cf. Keen, 2001). This identity is acknowledged by Keynes (1936) and 
thereby by his followers. Accordingly, money has an endogenous influence on both 
investment and debt. 
Summarizing, Minsky’s model thus links all elements of economic systems. In 
contrast, Krugman considers investment as exogenous to the model or determined in the real 
sector (cf. 1999), whereas other models consider that imbalances in capital flows are due the 
difference among international financial systems (cf. Caballero 2006). At the end, Krugman 
acknowledges the work of Minsky. If orthodox explanations are relevant for outlining the 
crisis in the 1990s, Minsky’s insights are relevant for the time to come. 
For heterodox economists, crises are inherent to both emerging and developed 
economies. According to orthodox economists, all domestic invulnerability, good balance 
sheets (Dornbusch 2001), no over-lending (McKinnon and Phil 1996) or strong assets 
(Caballero 2006) imply that no financial crisis will occur. But if these motives arise due to 
systemic causes, in Minsky’s model there is a chain of causal reactions (like in Keynes’s 
model of TGT [1936]), although the sequences vary from case to case in financial crises.  
In terms of method and vision, heterodox economists depart from Keynes’s legacy of 
uncertainty whereas orthodox economists follow neo-classical methods. It can be argued 26 
alternatively that heterodox economist follow either a Schumpeterian or a Marxian vision 
(cf. Keen 2001).  
On the more positive side of the comparison, orthodox models call attention to 
specific issues—for example, the impact of crises on income distribution (cf. Baldacci et al. 
2002). This topics is also studied by post-Keynesians. This means that both sets of models 
are complementary.  
This paper has only dealt with the theoretical background and policy implications of 
the heterodox perspective on financial crises. The diffusion, reception, acceptance, and 
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Krugman’s View of the Crises (Krugman, 1999) 
 (1') y = D(y, i, eP*/P) + NX(eP*/P, y)  
Where: 
y = national income, D = aggregate demand, i = interest rate, P* = foreign price level, P = 
domestic price level, e = exchange rate, NX = net exports 
 
Figure 1 




In Figure 3, after an ex post policy measure has been taken, the pressure in the exchange rate 
has been diminished at the price of reducing income. 
 